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Abstract  
 
This paper examines the tactical repertoires of three particular protest groups and how 
their internal objectives and decision making processes impacted upon their protest 
tactics and press coverage. The three groups cover a range of topics and used very 
different protest tactics, from a non-confrontational community campaign to a series of 
symbolic direct actions, and a mass demonstration. The concept of political opportunities 
is adapted for a more mediated politics to assess the success and failure of protest groups 
to propagate their messages, and the affect different media strategies and protest tactics 
has on this endeavour. The messages of each group are examined for their collective action 
frames and traced through protest group communications, protest actions, and into their 
framing in press coverage. The main argument put forward is that the success and failure 
of a protest group should be judged on what they do, their aims and goals, and not just the 
results of protest, such as press coverage. This gives a more complete picture to give a 
more complete of a protest group than just looking at the results of protest. 
 
 
Introduction 
 
This paper is concerned with protest group messages, the representation of protesters, 
their aims and goals, and how the decision making process influence their media and 
protest tactics. Before continuing it is worth giving a brief background to the three 
groups under investigation in this paper how they were structured, and their aims and 
goals. The groups were active at various stages between the years 2008 and 2010 in the 
UK. The first group was a Cardiff, UK based community campaign with a central 
committee of 5 people whose aim was to save a Victorian era pub from demolition, 
called Save the Vulcan. They had a very local focus, used non-confrontational protest 
tactics, and created close relationships with the regional press to create a high local 
media profile (Save the Vulcan 2010a). The second group protested against the 
expansion of Britain’s airports, and was spread nationally across the UK, and operated 
under the name Plane Stupid (Plane Stupid 2014). They were expressly non-
hierarchical and used more confrontational protest tactics, namely symbolic direct 
action to get their messages across. This tactic was used to attract press coverage 
through a use of spectacular stunts, and as will be shown, this generated a lot of press 
coverage. This occurred against the backdrop of political division over the future of 
Britain’s airports. The final group G20Meltdown were an umbrella organisation who 
represented approximately 65 different groups, operating non-hierarchically and were 
mainly based in London (G20Meltdown 2009b)1. They conducted a mass demonstration 
with a direct action element it targeted at the Group of 20 (G20) summit which was held 
in London in April 2009. The group attempted to capitalise on public and press 
attention on the MP expenses scandal and the financial crisis. Their actions fit into the 
sequence of international summit protests that have occurred around the world over 
the last 25 years following the Global Justice Movement’s rise to prominence at the 
World Trade Organisation meeting at Seattle, Washington in December 1999 (DeLuca 
and Peeples 2002).  
 
                                                          
1
 Please note: the G20Meltdown website no longer exists. A cached version can be found on the Internet 
Archive WaybackMachine (G20Meltdown 2009a). 
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Methods and Data Sources Used 
 
To fully investigate the collective action frames, protest tactics, and reactions of the 
press to the three groups several different empirical methods and data sources were 
used. In order to ‘follow the message’ the official websites and social media presences of 
the groups was analysed. This was done to uncover what the collective action frames at 
the centre of each campaign were, and the activists’ framing of their protest 
opportunities. In other words the reasons why a specific protest action was carried out, 
including references to the protest target and the timing of the action. The tracing of the 
messages through the protest actions and into the mainstream press required a 
targeted content analysis of press coverage for each group. For Plane Stupid and 
G20Meltdown these articles were taken from UK national newspapers, and for the Save 
the Vulcan campaign the press coverage was gather from the two main South Wales 
regional newspapers the Western Mail and South Wales Echo. The debates around the 
protest issues present in newspaper articles is said to reveal the ‘strategies of power or 
strategies for defining the rational and the commonsensical’ (Wahl-Jorgensen 2003, 
133-134).   
 
The sample articles were gathered in two ways, the first was from the online newspaper 
database Nexis but searching for the names of the groups, key figures, and variations of 
name/issue/protest. The reason for targeting each group was to allow for the inclusion 
of a wide range of publications, and to uncover their particular influence on the 
coverage, and how their messages were reported in the press, rather than the issue as a 
whole. This method yielded 126 articles for the Save the Vulcan campaign (between 
September 2008 and May 2010), 207 articles for Plane Stupid (between February 2008 
and June 2009), and finally 97 articles for G20Meltdown (between January 2009 and 
June 2009). To compliment these methods an ethnography was carried out with the 
Save the Vulcan group, along with interviews with several participants involved in each 
of the campaigns. The following sections are based on insights from the interviews and 
data from the other methods. This paper will now detail the theoretical framework, the 
results of the empirical research and discuss the implications of the findings for protest 
groups and for future academic research. 
 
 
Political and Media Opportunities 
 
The interaction between protest groups, the media, and their political targets is where 
the conceptual framework of political opportunities comes into the argument. Political 
opportunities concerns the external influences upon collective action, and by extension, 
the relative success and failure of protest groups. The very definition of political 
opportunities refers to the shaping of collective action by environmental, institutional, 
and political variables (Eisinger 1973; Gamson and Meyer 1996; Sireau 2009). However, 
the construction of this theory is far too structural to be applicable to all groups, and 
this allows room for refinement. This is central to the two arguments which will be put 
forward in this paper. The first is concerned with the level of prominence granted to the 
media, because media opportunities are often the first place to go for any protest group 
attempting to highlight an issues and/or pressurise a protest target. This increased 
prominence plays a key role in the success and failure of groups to publicise their 
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messages (McCurdy 2013). It is the normative role of the media to act as a space for 
political debate, its potential public reach, and its ability to increase the salience of an 
issue. Second, political opportunities does not take into account the aims and goals of 
protest groups in its assessment of success and failure. The assumption is that activists 
are striving for political acceptance when this is clearly not the case for all groups. In 
order to ascertain the level of success and failure this research focused in on the 
messaging of each group and how they communicated their aims and goals to the wider 
public. This is in keeping with Diani’s message focused approach to political 
opportunities, where this messaging is influenced by different political and media 
contexts (1996:1067).  
 
 
The Press in Relation to Collective Action 
 
The decision to act, and the protest tactics used is based upon the choices of a protest 
group, their aims, and the opportunity to protest. These decisions have a massive 
impact on the tone and quantity of press coverage. The reaction of the media to 
different types of protest has been examined extensively by numerous academics, and 
the general consensus tends to be the more spectacular tactics used the greater the 
likelihood that reasons behind a collective action will become lost (Rosie and Gorringe 
2009a; Wykes 2000; Gitlin 1980; Wahl-Jorgensen 2003). Furthermore, this goes beyond 
the reporting of just the collective action to include depictions of the protesters 
themselves (Gitlin, 1980; Wahl-Jorgensen 2003). This relationship between protest and 
press coverage takes its cues from the general media coverage of social conflict where 
much of the reporting surrounds the three themes of deviance, crime and violence. All 
three of which are potentially apparent in more confrontational forms of protest. As 
Cohen pointed out in his classic study on moral panics the media role is to set the 
agenda, transmit images, and break the silence by making claims (Cohen: xxiviii-xxix). 
In practice this is the selecting and highlighting of events which have an element of 
deviance attached to them.  
 
It also relates to the prominence of certain news sources which aid in diminishing or 
heightening a moral panic, or it is these very claims makers who are able to provoke a 
panic by themselves (ibid: xxiviii-xxix). The second point about news sources is 
particularly relevant for protest groups, because if a group is able to have its voice 
heard it will be more capable of defining an issue in its terms. However, this power to 
define runs very much in line with Becker’s idea of a ‘hierarchy of credibility’ which is 
based upon ‘who represents the forces of approved and official morality’ (Becker 1967: 
240). This so called ‘morality’ fits in with crime narratives in the news as Hall et al’s 
research showed that the news reports crime so it ‘evokes threats to, but also reaffirms 
the consensual morality of the society’ (1977: 64). This brings about the idea of a 
societal consensus where actions are deemed as legitimate and illegitimate, and this is 
particularly evident in the coverage of protest. A point which is reflected in the 
perception of protest groups when their actions and politics are seen as ‘illegitimate and 
‘deviant’’, and challenges to political consensus are portrayed as being “potentially 
violent” (Murdock 1973: 156-157).  
 
Gaining credibility in the eyes of the press is incredibly difficult for a protest group to 
achieve, which is why activists may resort to more ‘hit and run’ style tactics that play 
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with the event based nature of news. In many respects, apart from technological 
advances, little has changed since Murdock’s research into militant mass protest where 
he laid out the four ways in which collective action is covered: 
 
1) Crossing the newsworthy threshold – as in the general characteristics a protest 
needs to meet before it is cover e.g. number of people, how spectacular, 
potential/actual violence.  
2) The attention of the news tends to focus upon the construction of a protest 
rather than the issues. In other words the type of protest, timeline of events, who 
was there, and what happened.  
3) Media attention tends to be temporary, and once a protest event is over media 
attention dissipates quickly.  
4) Finally, a fully explanation of the issues occurs only when the message coincides 
with political consensus (Murdock 1973: 163-164) 
 
It would be unfair and disempowering to protest groups to not state that they are 
conscious of these media conventions, because activists are ‘reflexively aware’ of how 
and why the media functions as it does for two reasons; 1) activists are often sources for 
news organizations, and 2) activists are also consumers of news media and know about 
how the media have covered protest in the past (McCurdy 2013: 61). Therefore, it is the 
use of spectacular tactics which recognises and exploits news values. For Gamson and 
Meyer it is this spectacular aspect of protest which is the key to its newsworthiness: 
 
Spectacle means drama and confrontation, emotional events with people who 
have fire in the belly, who are extravagant and unpredictable. This puts a high 
premium on novelty, on costume, and on confrontation. Violent action in 
particular has the most of these media valued elements. Fire in the belly is fine, 
but fire on the ground photographs is better. (Gamson and Meyer 1996: 288) 
 
The spectacle in this instance is the visual attraction that prompts the press to cover a 
protest, and in doing so blurs the line between staged media spectacle and the 
expression of political beliefs. A more recent interpretation of the news values of 
spectacular protest comes from Rucht, and are as follows: 
 
1) Size of protest, i.e., the number of people participating 
2) Degree of disruptiveness or radicalness 
3) Creativity or newness of the form of action and its accompanying symbolic 
elements 
4) The political weight or public prominence of individuals or groups supporting or 
actually participating in the protest (Rucht 2013: 257) 
 
What should be interpreted from this is that for protest to be featured in the press it 
needs have an aspect of theatre. In-turn this means that activists have become actors on 
the media stage, as opposed to politically aware individuals. This interpretation is what 
led Wall to compare protest to a ‘performance’ where ‘activism […] is a method of 
performance that must be developed and improvised’ (1999: 96). The danger that this 
presents for protest groups is that by stepping out of character could potentially lose 
media interest, and increases the probability of exploitation and celebritisation of 
protesters which inevitably comes from having a high media profile. 
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How this relates to media framing of protest is the ‘selection and salience’ of particular 
issues within a news story given higher prominence over another (Entman 1993: 52). 
Or to use Gamson’s analogy this selection process is a ‘thought organiser’ where 
different perspectives about an event or issue are narrowed down to a small number or 
one overriding frame:  
 
Like a picture frame, it puts a border around something, distinguishing it from 
what is around it. A frame spotlights certain events and their underlying causes 
and consequences, and directs our attention away from others. (Gamson 2003: 
para 21) 
 
The neutrality of this picture fame ‘however’ is questionable, as Entman states a frame 
creates an ‘imprint of power’ (1993: 55). Although, it is unfair to state that there is one 
monolithic narrative which originates from all media because frames come from the 
ideological viewpoint of the media outlet. These will be inconsistent, but this is not to 
say that one dominant master frame does not exists. Moreover, think of these master 
frames as representing a status quo, but equally contain discrepancies, disagreements 
and differences over issues and their solutions, and this is where protest groups have a 
media opportunity to open these cleavages and present their messages.  
 
 
Press Representation of Each Group 
 
The press remains the place where the majority of political debate is prompted and 
takes places, and in this respect the press acts as a ‘validator’ for protester concerns 
(Gamson and Meyer 1996:290). Equally, the press acted as a platform for the messages 
and issues under protest by each of the group’s investigated, and this is regardless of 
whether or not the concerns of the groups were ‘validated’. It is the press 
representation which really separates the three groups. In this analysis a newspaper 
article is treated as the unit of analysis and potentially featured many thematic 
elements, and for this reason more than one top level category could be recorded, but 
sub-categories were recorded only once. The Save the Vulcan as a local community 
campaign with their non-confrontational tactics and received extremely favourable 
press coverage. This point is evidenced by the key category which appeared most often 
in news articles. This was the recognition of protest which appeared 60 times or 37%. 
This top level category consisted of a number of sub-categories around explicit support 
for the campaign in articles and a focus on the issues. What is often extremely important 
for protest groups is that there is a focus on the issues, and in the case of Save the 
Vulcan this occurred 36 times or 22%. This variable was recorded when an issue was 
explained at length. What followed from on from a focus on the issues was expressed 
support for the campaign in a total of 24 articles out of 126 or 15% of total. 
Subsequently, this demonstrates that when the press places a substantial focus on the 
issues there will be a more supportive tone to the coverage.  
 
The coverage of the Save the Vulcan campaign is in stark contrast to Plane Stupid and 
G20Meltdown. Taking Plane Stupid first and the major focus in the press were around 
aspects of law and order and the spectacle of protest. Within the content analysis law 
and order occurred 188 times (or 43% of articles). This was recorded when the press 
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mentioned topics such as arrests, disruption to the public, court proceedings, and police 
or security concerns. These reactions of the press are perhaps understandable when 
direct action is used because of its potential illegality, but that said, a major focus on law 
and order serves to move a protest from the frame of an act of democratic expression to 
one of criminality. This, when taken together with the press’ fascination with the 
spectacle of protest which occurred 172 times (or in 38% of articles) meant that there 
was plenty of content within the reports which diverted attention from the coverage of 
the issues and reasons why people were protesting. The spectacle of protest included 
the structure of protest which is when the press details the demographics of a protest or 
some other logistical detail, reference to historical protest, and personal information 
about the activists.  
 
Similarly, G20Meltdown’s actions were framed by a focus on law and order and the 
spectacle of protest. There was however a different element which precluded the 
protest that helped the press to create an atmosphere of an anticipation of violence. 
This brings to the fore the relationship between the press and the police, because in the 
February of 2009 following a Metropolitan Police briefing the Guardian produced an 
article that set forth two scenarios of what was going to happen at the G20 summit 
demonstration: 
 
1. Violence would occur, and it would be on a par with the 1990 Poll Tax riots in 
London 
2. Activists from these riots, as well as other historic actions would be coming out 
of retirement with the sole intention of causing disruption (Lewis 2009: 1) 
 
This press briefing, as will be shown, created a master frame from which the press could 
use as an interpretive anchor to judge not only the mass demonstration but the 
demonstrators who took part as well. Again, as with Plane Stupid, law and order and the 
spectacle of protest were the most common themes found in press coverage. When 
taken together these two categories constituted 81% (250 out of 309 occurrences) of all 
themes found in the reporting. If these two categories are then broken down into their 
sub-themes it is clear what impact the police briefing, the protest tactics, and the 
historical coverage of mass demonstrations had on the reporting. The most frequent 
sub-category was the anticipation of violence that includes the fear that violence will 
happen on a protest, or if violence has already occurred that more will follow (17% of 
all themes, but apparent in 53 of the 97 articles). As with Plane Stupid the structure of 
protest was reported on frequently and constituted 12% of themes or in 37 reports, and 
this is closely followed by the coverage of the police operation (11%, or 35 articles). 
This included the number of police present, the equipment they had, the policing tactics 
used and so on. The next most common, and this bears remembering when considering 
the police briefing reported on in the Guardian, was the evocation of historical protest. 
This occurred in 22 articles or 7% of all themes, and in some ways can be seen as the 
press’ attempt to contextualise the protests by discussing historical examples. However, 
what was evident from the coverage was the historical protests mentioned had ended in 
violence and disruption. As with Plane Stupid the talk and predictions of violence 
merely served to distract from the issues under protest, and to create an interpretation 
of how the demonstration should be perceived.  
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Before moving on it is important to mention the relationship between protester and 
press, and how attitudes towards the media impact on a group’s tactical repertoire. 
Press coverage happens because of a media outlets decision to deem a protest 
newsworthy enough to be covered, and most importantly protest groups can only 
influence not control how they are reported. This leaves activists open to being 
potentially exploited by the press, or they feel the pressure to stay in character by acting 
and conforming to what the press expects. The attitude of activists towards the press 
ranges wildly from cooperative and open to ambivalent or averse. For Rucht there are 
four specific reactions to a lack of media coverage available to protest groups:   
 
1) Abstention – Following a number of negative experiences at attempting to 
influence the press a group withdraws entirely from attempting to gain 
press coverage. 
2) Attack – Explicitly critiquing acting against the mainstream media. 
3) Adaptation – Accepting or exploiting the press and its unwritten rules to 
increase the probability of positive coverage. 
4) Alternatives – In order to compensate for a lack of press attention or to 
correct the misconceptions of the press activists can create their own 
media, from leaflets and zines, to websites and online forums. (2004: 36-
37) 
 
The most important ‘A’ on this list in relation to media strategies is ‘adaptation’, because 
it differentiates between the protest action or ‘front stage’, and the organisation of 
collective action or the ‘backstage’, and the impact this has on protester’s attitudes 
towards the press (Feigenbaum et al. 2013: 74). What is also important to note is that 
protest groups are not necessarily striving for political acceptance/change or press 
popularity. For instance, the Save the Vulcan campaign wanted political change and 
positive press coverage to achieve their aims. Plane Stupid wanted to prompt debates 
around airport expansion through the use of direct action, and this was not dependent 
on press support or an acceptance of their protest tactics. Finally, G20Meltdown’s mass 
demonstration was to highlight a range of different issues, not necessarily to put 
pressure on parliament, because the group were more likely to advocate political 
revolution. However, in terms of the issues each of the groups were campaigning on it is 
correct to say that ‘radical ideas require more space than events’ (Doherty et al. 2003: 
675), and this so called space can be created by using stunts and spectacular tactics. 
 
 
Protester Framing of Messages 
 
Exploring a protest groups messages requires an examination of the collective actions 
frames contained in the various protest communications methods. This type of framing 
demonstrates a group’s interpretation of an issue, and functions on three different 
levels; 1) as a diagnostic tool, as in defining an issues; 2) highlighting an issue as a 
problem; 3) and the suggestion of possible solutions to a grievance (Gamson 2003; 
Sireau 2009; Smith et al. 2001; Snow and Benford 1992; Entman 1993). Furthermore, 
the protest messages themselves work on the following different levels: 
 
1) Broad outline or mention of the overarching issue 
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2) Description of the causalities relating to an issue 
3) Any attempts to attribute blame for an issue 
4) A detailed chain of causality point to who should be blamed for an issue 
(Sireau 2009: 137) 
 
The success of the message in some ways is determined by what level of interpretation 
the press grants it, and to what extent the issue is explained. However, the concept of 
collective action frames has been criticised by Gamson and Meyer in particular who 
claim that protest groups are denied the agency to challenge the status quo, or master 
frame, through their protest activities (1996: 283). Instead they say that protest groups 
are ‘agents of their own history’ (ibid: 285), and this is particularly important when 
research such as this moves away from looking at how protest groups carry out 
particular actions to why. This brings the internal decision making process of protest 
groups into more focus, and increases the prominence of how groups interpret their 
own messages, and grants collective action frames more prominence in the choice of 
media and protest tactics (Lipsky 1968; Eisinger 1973). 
 
 
Attempting to Control the Message 
 
The decisions behind how and when to carry out a protest action is not as spontaneous 
as it might appear on the surface. There are many variables which need to be measured 
in order for an action to be considered successful. This includes dangers to the public 
and activists, potential media coverage, political impact and so on. Part of this process is 
to attempt to control the messages and the representation of the group in the press. 
This will often be dependent on the type of protest tactics used, the media strategies, 
and the relationship of the group to the press. This is where the groups differed most. 
For instance, the Save the Vulcan campaign practiced the most non-confrontation 
protest tactics but shared the same attitudes towards the press as the more 
confrontational symbolic direct action group Plane Stupid. Both of these groups 
believed in a simple, straight forward, but consistent message was key to getting their 
message across and achieving their objectives. Even the name ‘Save the Vulcan’ was 
created to carry a very simple message. This clarity of message was seen as one of the 
key elements in informing the public about the issues and by extension influencing 
political decision makers. To achieve consistency both groups attempted to control their 
messages by factoring this into the actions they carried out. For example, only allowing 
certain members of a group talk to the press, in other words members with experience 
of talking to the press, or with some media training about interview techniques and 
what to expect from press interviews.  
 
In comparison, Plane Stupid used their direct actions as a message carrier for their 
campaign. Essentially using the spectacle of their tactics to attract the press, and once 
they had gained media attention the activists from within the group would give 
interviews and push the campaign’s messages. Another way to think about this type of 
issue highlighting is that the protest tactics are acting as a ‘Trojan horse’ for the 
messages. When G20Meltdown’s press tactics are considered there is a definite contrast 
in approaches. First, rather that have specific spokespeople, and in an arguably more 
democratic approach, everyone was allowed to speak to the press. They did not have a 
defined media strategy and maintained no intention to create one, to quote one activist 
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they ‘did not take an attitude of we must sit down and sort out our media strategy’ 
(Pepper 2009).  
 
The basis of this type of media strategy is that the activists trusted each other to make 
non-damaging statements if and when they were approached by journalists. However, 
this left the group’s messaging lacking in a cohesive narrative, and with so many groups 
present at the G20 demonstration there was a lot of ‘noise’ and competition for 
attention. This gave a fragmented appearance to the protest, and this splintering of 
attention left the press focusing on the most outspoken and charismatic members of the 
group. Furthermore, the structure of each group impacted upon how well they were 
able to control their messages, because the amount of people responsible differed in 
each case. Plane Stupid and Save the Vulcan only needed to rely on a relatively small 
number of activists, but G20Metldown needed to consider all of the different groups 
operating under this banner. This control issue is not only relevant for the messaging of 
each group, it also applies to the direction that collective action goes in. The sheer 
amount of people involved in a mass demonstration makes it far more difficult to guide 
and control what attendees might do, whereas smaller actions are dependent only on 
those activists involved.  
 
 
Cost Benefit Analysis of Protest Action 
 
Moving on from the messaging strategies of each group and onto the protest tactics that 
they used to promote and highlight the issues under protest. This is where the internal 
negotiation mechanisms within each group comes into place, and is related to a 
consideration of the potential negative and positive outcomes of different types of 
protest action – or as titled here a cost benefit analysis of protest action. This 
assessment of protest tactics is derived from the aims and goals of a group, and from 
here has an influence on whether or not a protest can be considered a success or failure.  
 
As already explained the Save the Vulcan campaign were the least confrontational of the 
three groups and at no point resorted to direct action. The one demonstration they did 
hold was designed more as a photo opportunity attended by supporters and politicians 
to deliver a petition to the Welsh Government rather than an oppositional protest 
(O'Connor 2009: 7). This less confrontational approach was due in part to the structure 
of the group and the demographics of the supporters. Being a campaign trying to save a 
pub the campaign’s core support came from within this constituency and included older 
community members and students. These stakeholders in the campaign would not have 
necessarily have been so supportive if the tactics had been more confrontational, but 
this is not to say that the group was not able to get more aggressive. For instance, there 
were two protests planned against the brewery attached to the pub, S.A. Brains whose 
brewery is situated in Cardiff. However, both of the planned protests were cancelled 
because the very threat of a mass march, and negative publicity for the brewery was 
enough to prompt Brains into helping protect the pub’s future. There was talk within 
the groups that if the pub had come under a more imminent threat of demolition then 
the protest tactics would have become much more aggressive, as the high profile 
support and then AM Jenny Randerson (now Baroness Randerson) was quoted as 
saying ‘we’ll chain ourselves to the pumps if we have to’ (Quoted in McCarthy 2009: 2). 
Perhaps this was something said as a throw away comment the fact remained that if the 
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group wanted to be more confrontational it could have been. When these types of 
tactics are compared to the other two groups there is a definitive difference in the tone 
and confrontational nature of the protest employed.  
 
If we take Plane Stupid first and their campaign against the expansion of British 
airports, the most high profile of which was against the expansion of Heathrow Airport. 
The group were not the only set of activists campaigning on this issue, but they were the 
most direct action orientated. In emphasising this idea of a cost benefit analysis of 
protest one of the Plane Stupid activists described their internal decision making 
structure, and what considerations were taken before carrying out an action: 
 
… first thing that we do is someone would suggest an idea and then we would 
bash it around. We did loads of R and D where we would come up with ideas for 
things and then discuss their viability and efficacy. (Activist 1 2010) 
 
The variables involved in such ‘R and D’ include the demographics of the protests 
involved in an actions, the potential press coverage that will occur, and safety 
considerations for public and protesters. These should not be underestimated when 
investigating protest. It is because these decisions are part of a greater whole which is 
directly linked to the messaging of a group, as one activist put it ‘all of these things are 
taken into consideration when you are trying to convey a narrative’ (Activist 2 2010). 
This narrative is subsequently transmitted to the wider public via the press, and the 
importance of the press in this endeavour is emphasised by Plane Stupid activist Dan 
Glass who said ‘Before we do an action we try to visualise what the front page of the 
newspaper will be’ (2011). In order to fully exploit this media centric view Plane Stupid 
would time their actions to correspond with other events, and these occasions were 
usually associated with the issue or the environment generally. For example, in 
February 2008 Plane Stupid occupied the roof of the House of Commons and this 
protest action was timed in correlation with the end of the government’s consultation 
on the expansion of Heathrow Airport, and at the same time as Prime Minister’s 
Questions in the Commons’ Chamber itself (Plane Stupid 2008). You could call this 
planned opportunism by using the event based nature of news, external events, and 
spectacular tactics to exploit media attention and maximise the impact of the protest. 
Furthermore, Plane Stupid’s collective actions were never a one off, they were included 
as part of a series of ongoing direct actions to keep media attention high, and to attempt 
at creating a coherent narrative that would tie all of these events together through the 
use of tightly controlled messaging.  
 
Similarly G20Meltdown represented themselves as the radical point to the G20 protests 
with lots of groups at the demonstration all vying for, or even competing for attention. 
The largest of which was the coalition of charities and trade unions called Put People 
First whose demonstration occurred in the week before G20Meltdown’s collective 
action on 28th March and 1st April respectively (Put People First 2009). Equally, on the 
day of G20Meltdown’s demonstration the environmental direct action group Climate 
Camp were also protesting. These two protest entities had been in contact and 
communicating with each other over what shape the various actions that day would 
take, but Climate Camp decided not to protest under the banner name G20Meltdown. 
This had the knock on effect of dividing press attention and fragmenting the activist 
groups rather than the protest appearing as a single, unified entity with a set of clear 
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messages. This is not a criticism of the group as such, because when speaking to the 
activists involved in G20Meltdown the considered themselves ‘the only thing in town’, 
and their aims and goals were not necessarily interested in a cost benefit analysis of 
their actions (Activist 3 2010).  
 
Their aim was to differentiate G20Meltdown’s protest with previous summit 
demonstrations by using slightly different tactics, or as Pepper puts it be ‘more than just 
a march’. She goes further to state that this approach is more about filling the gap 
between ‘boring A-B marching on the one hand, and Molotov lobbing on the other’ 
(Pepper 2009). Their different approach to mass protest is reflected in G20Meltdown’s 
aforementioned media strategy, which was not as high a priority when compared to 
Plane Stupid or Save the Vulcan. That is not to say that they were actively negative 
towards the press, on the contrary their belief was that the demonstration would be an 
event of such size that the press would come to the group, and not the other way 
around. One activist framed this as ‘the media riding our coattails’ (Activist 3 2010). The 
attempted exploitation and creation of political and media opportunities as shown is all 
about the choice of what repertoire of protest to employ, but what is worth bearing in 
mind is that protest tactics are part of an ongoing evolutionary process of activism (Wall 
1999: 42). This means that protest groups learn from past activists, and apply these 
lessons to their own campaigns and adapt for the political and media context from 
which they are working within. This point is highlighted by the already mentioned 
quadruple As, where adaptation is one of these ‘As’ and Rucht believes that this is 
required to make issues more prominent (2004: 36-37). This section has highlighted is 
that media and protest tactics are based on a cost benefit analysis of protest and what 
can be achieved by using one type of action over another.  
 
 
Seizing the Opportunity 
 
What the above section has shown is that deciding to act is much more than a simple 
calculation of what actions will or will not generate press coverage. It is clear that other 
considerations are taken into account, such as protest opportunities, which are the 
decisions to act against a particular protest target, or to time an action to correspond 
with other events. The key argument to be made here is that protest groups do not carry 
out collective action without an awareness of the potential positive and negative 
outcomes. This is what Gamson and Meyer referred to as ‘relative opportunities’ which 
permits groups increased awareness around their role in their own representations 
(1996: 283, emphasis in original).  The variation in tactical approaches and choice of 
protest actions was very much driven by the aims of each group.  
 
However, to be successful when creating protest actions with the goal of press attention 
requires a certain ‘intensity’ and the ability to create ‘news hooks’ (Smith et al. 2001: 
1402), because the ‘media and attention cycle is notoriously short’ (Rosie and Gorringe 
2009b: 5.7). The choice of protest tactics in relation to press coverage on the whole 
follows the equation that the more non-confrontational protest tactics are the greater 
the likelihood of thematic coverage. However, by not being confrontational it is more 
difficult to attract press coverage in the first place. On the other hand symbolic direct 
action and disruptive protest, as already mentioned, has been historically 
decontextualised, depoliticised, and episodic (Iyengar 1991: 14; Smith et al. 2001: 
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1404). This view requires more nuance, especially for groups like Plane Stupid, whose 
tactical choice was not a matter of choosing spectacle over debate it was more about 
using spectacle to prompt debate. The other big factor of press coverage following a 
protest action is all about timing, and this is particularly evident when Plane Stupid’s 
direct action is compared to G20Meltdown’s mass demonstration.  
 
Timing is increasingly relevant when considering media and political opportunities 
because these refer to a particular moment in time and reflect a specific political and 
media context.  It is these two major variables which shape the openness of media and 
political opportunities at any one time, and for protest groups effective timing of their 
actions aids in fully exploiting these opportunities. However, the key difference between 
Plane Stupid and G20Meltdown’s actions is a matter of press prior knowledge. Direct 
action, by its very nature often has a substantial surprise element attached, but a mass 
demonstration is often known about well in advance. This has a subsequent impact on 
press coverage, because by using the element of surprise this catches the press off-
guard and allows less rime for negative stereotyping or an atmosphere of an 
anticipation of violence. On the other hand with a pre-determined date for a mass 
demonstration the press has the opportunity to frame the interpretation of a protest 
event will unfold. In the case of G20Meltdown the case was similar to previous summit 
protests where an atmosphere of fear and expected violence was generated, and the 
activist’s messages become lost in the hype. This correlates well, for instance, with the 
Rosie and Gorringe’s work that focused upon the G8 in Scotland in 2005, and the G20 
summit in London in 2009 where the coverage of both of these events was beset by an 
anticipation of violence frame created by the press (2009a, 2009b).  
 
The ability of the press to generate this type of frame is aided by the historical 
treatment of protests. This includes the use of historical references to contextualise and 
anchor the press’ interpretation of the protesters actions. The time before a mass 
demonstration takes place blank pages need to be filled, and the ‘news hole’ created is 
filled by sensationalising protester intentions and what happened at similar events in 
the past. The historicising of protest by the press goes beyond merely talking about 
previous events, it is something which extends to references to historical high-profile 
protesters, such as the environmental direct action campaigner Swampy (Wykes 2000), 
or more generally, as Gitlin put it ‘celebrated radicals become radical celebrities; four-
star attractions in the carnival of distracting and entertaining international symbols’ 
(1980: 162). Although, there is a choice to be made by the press as to their preferred 
framing and what type of historical anchors they are going to use when reporting on a 
protest, peaceful or disruptive.  
 
 
Conclusion 
 
The comparison of groups as found in this paper allows for a greater assessment of the 
political and media contexts that each group was working with, and how this impacted 
on each group. It is the media context which is ‘essential to a full understanding of any 
given protest’ (Rosie and Gorringe 2009b: 2.9), but it is a groups awareness and 
knowledge of the media context which impacts on a group’s actions. What needs to be 
highlighted is that gaining media coverage and achieving some kind of political 
legitimacy is not the goal of every group. When analysing protest groups with this in 
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mind moves research beyond judging a group’s success and failure based on only the 
nature of media coverage. This is in addition to following the messages through their 
inception and into press coverage increases the scope of the interpretation of collective 
action. One of the aims of this research is to raise the importance of the media in the 
development of political opportunities. Previously defined as the structural and general 
openings in the political system (Gamson and Meyer 1996; Sireau 2009; Meyer 2004), 
by adding media opportunities to this definition gives some communicative power back 
to protest groups. This increases the theory’s applicability for radical groups who do not 
seek political acceptance or positive media coverage. This helps to raise the agency of a 
protest group to guide their own destiny, and do not undertake protest without 
considering the potential impacts. This extra variable gives a significant boost to 
interpreting the success and failure of protest groups.  
 
This paper has taken the approach to what is success and failure by linking it to the 
propagation of a group’s message. What Gamson argues about success is that it is an 
‘elusive idea’ which is based on the outcomes of protest (1990: 28). But the examination 
of success should be judged on the aims and goals of a protest group, and therefore 
taken on a group by group basis. This helps to break the more institutional approach of 
political opportunities in particular the views of Meyer and Amenta et al (2004: 126; 
1992: 323). The goals of a group are granted increased prominence (Gamson 1990: 36), 
and this is why the salience of the message was a major aspect to this research. How 
prominent these messages are in the press, whether or not they are fully contextualised 
are influenced by media and political opportunities. What this all means is that the 
media and political opportunities available to, or created by a protest group have a 
major impact on the success and failure of activists to transmit their messages. But it is 
the protest group’s awareness of media and political opportunities and their ability to 
exploit these opportunities using certain protest tactics and media strategies which are 
needed to place a group into a position to succeed or fail. Otherwise their messages and 
the issues under protest will remain hidden and unreported. 
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